It turns out it was General Tommy Franks, not Carl Rove who who requested that the President address the troops and thank them after major combat operations (Gen Franks' term, not the President's) had ended.
Referencing pp 523-4 of American Soldier, General Franks writes:
"Mr Secretary," I said to Donald Rumsfeld at the end of our scheduled phase VTC." We've been talking about the timing of Phase IV. The British are going to hold a victory parade when their first combat units return from the Gulf. But our soldiers aren't going home yet. I'd like to figure out a way to acknowledge their sacrifice and service. There's a lot of work to be done over there, but major combat operations are over." I wanted the Secretary - or the President - to publically acknowledge this fact for the troops.And there was another reason to make a public statement about the end of Phase III. There were Coalition members who didn't want to participate in combat, but had said they would help once that phase was over. "I'd like to see some of them start bringing in their reconstruction and humanitarian assistance troops," I told Rumsfeld.
"What do you have in mind, Tom?"
"It would be good if the President could acknowledge the success of major combat operations, Mr. Secretary." I tried to find the right words. "The troops have accomplished every mission we gave them. There's never been a combat operation as successful as Iraqi Freedom."
"I'll talk to the President," Don Rumsfeld said.
Unintended consequences.
I was grateful on the first of May for the President's words. Little did I know the criticism he would face for doing what I had recommended."
Also, on the post-war situation, General Franks writes (page 254):
"Jay Garner is going into this situation badly handicapped," [Franks' J-5 Director Rookie] Robb said. "His organization is behind. They haven't gathered the financial support and resources they require. And Jay doesn't have the kind of open checkbook he'll need to immediately rehire the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis put out of work by the Coalition." A key point I thought. When so many in Iraq's military laid down their weapons and simply walked home, it made ORHA's job much more difficult - and costly.Before the war had begun, Garner had spent weeks walking the corridors of Washington, hat in hand. He needed people and money. But he could only suggest a hypothetical situation: If the United States went to war, could your department provide....?
No experienced bureaucrat would refuse a hypothetical request. They would meet it - with hypothetical resources, vague promises that cost their department nothing in terms of funds or personnel.
But the situation on the ground today was real, not hypothetical.
Tommy Franks' book is not only a good read but revealing of many behind the scenes facts. One extremely interesting piece has to do with how the Coalition successfully used the three-day sand storm to extremely effective military use while back home armchair commanders were calling the invasion "bogged down", and "stalled".
Also, the it is revealing just how imminent the threat of WMD use was perceived to be by coalition forces.
By all means, get and read this fascinating book.