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May 10, 2006

Combat ineffective

Centcom is reporting that documents recently captured reveal that if anything, the Islamist enemy is not delusional about their situation in Iraq: they fully realize that they are combat ineffective. They also realize that they are nothing more than an annoyance.

...Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and   Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to   controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni   people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite   government. The only power the mujahidin have is what they have already   demonstrated in hunting down drifted patrols and taking sniper shots at those   patrol members who stray far from their patrols, or planting booby traps among   the citizens and hiding among them in the hope that the explosions will injure   an American or members of the government.  In other words, these activities   could be understood as hitting the scared and the hiding ones, which is an   image that requires a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s wisdom.

The strength of the brothers in   Baghdad is built mainly on booby trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin   groups in Baghdad are generally groups of assassin without any organized   military capabilities.

There is a clear  absence of   organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the   leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein.    Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the   group undertake a join operations

In Baghdad, they are running out of ammo

The mujahidin do not have any   stored weapons and ammunition in their possession in Baghdad, particularly   rockets, such as C5K Katyosha or bomber or mortars which we realized their   importance and shortage in Baghdad.  That was due to lack of check and   balance, and proper follow-ups.

And people

Northern al-Karkh groups are estimated at 40 mujahid, so is the Southern Karkh.    They could double that number if necessary.  Al-Rassafah groups in general is   estimated at 30 mujahidin as I was informed by the commander of al-Rassafah.   These are very small numbers compared to the tens of thousands of the enemy   troops.  How can we increase these numbers?

And their leaders have been rendered ineffective by Task Force 147

The current commander of   Northern al-Karkh (Abu-Huda) is very concerned because of his deteriorating   security situation caused by being pursued by the Americans, since they have   his picture and voice print.  Therefore, his movement is very restricted and   he is unable to do anything here. We should remove him from Baghdad to a   location where he can work easier; otherwise he is closer to become totally   ineffective.  I know nothing about his past military experience or   organizational skills.

They only success they openly claim is that they have hoodwinked the Western media

The policy followed by the brothers   in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to   capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the   strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the   government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them.    This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the   media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy   operations which follow the same direction.

This direction has large positive effects; however, being preoccupied with it alone delays more important operations such as taking control of some areas, preserving it and assuming power in Baghdad (for example, taking control of  a university, a hospital, or a Sunni religious site).

At the same time, they recognize that the steadfastnes of US forces has led to their defeat

At the same time, the Americans and the Government were able to absorb our painful blows, sustain them, compensate their losses with new replacements, and follow strategic plans which allowed them in the past few years to take control of Baghdad as well as other areas one after the other.  That is why every year is worse than the previous year as far as the Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad.

It seems the only ones without a clue as to what's going on in Iraq, are the news wires who pride themselves on keeing us informed about what's going on in Iraq.

For those of you who care, the full text of the letter in arabic is here.

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